Dissertation
Master of Advanced Studies in Humanitarian Action

Academic Year 2018-2019

Roles and Responsibilities of National Military in Crisis Response:
A case study of Brazil

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August 2019
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank firstly my parents, my brother and my sister for all their support during this Masters. It was not easy to stay apart from you during this year, but your love helped me to go through this experience and to achieve my objective.

I am deeply thankful to my husband for agreeing to be apart during this period which enabled me to grow personally and professionally. Thank you for encouraging me, to push me further and to, more than anyone, believe in me and in my capacity. Thank you for even being far away, stayed by my side every day giving me support through this journey.

I would like to kindly thank my supervisor Claire Barthélémy for her contribution in my learning process and especially to her insights on my dissertation. Thank you for always being open to talk and for supporting me during my episodes of personal insecurity. Your kindness motivated me to go further.

To all the Cerah’s staff and professors, my sincere thanks for all your contribution in my professional growth.

I am thankful to all my classmates and all my friends from the International Residence for their friendship during this year. I am carrying all the stories, memories and laughs with me wherever I go.

With this dissertation I hope to be contributing at least a little to the humanitarian sector. I dedicated myself to bring a fair discussion to this dissertation and to enrich the debate about the humanitarian assistance in Latin America, especially to my country, Brazil.
Abstract
In the last decades, several affected states have shown willingness to answer to crisis without direct international support and therefore relied in national military assets to build a response. This has become a challenge to crisis response since, in several cases, the military can be considered part of the conflict or work under different principles than humanitarian organizations. Yet armed forces are increasingly part of the humanitarian environment and their roles and responsibilities should be better understood to improve crisis response in conflict and non-conflict areas. Thus, this dissertation focuses on the analysis of challenges and limits to the use of national military in time of crisis based on the case study of Brazil during the migrant crisis of Venezuela (2017-2019). I argue that the main challenges and limits to the use of national military for crisis response in non-conflict areas are the timing of the political decision and the deployment, relocation efforts and the coordination of actors in the operational and strategic levels. There are also benefits that should be taken into consideration, such as military capacity of immediate response, its logistic expertise and possibility of medical support.

Keywords: crisis response; non-formal actors; humanitarian response; military assistance; national military; migrants; Brazil.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 Research Question, Methodology and Limitations .............................................................................. 7

2 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 10

2.2 Informal actors in humanitarian response: the role of national military ............................... 14

2.3 Military assistance in Latin America ................................................................................................. 19

3 DISCUSSION: NATIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE. 21

3.1 Case Study: Operation Acolhida ...................................................................................................... 21

3.2 Challenges and limits for the use of national military assistance .................................................. 27

3.2.1 Immediate response, logistic expertise and medical support ...................................................... 27

3.2.2. Timing, blurring the lines, relocation phase and coordination with regional governments ........................................................................................................................................... 29

4 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 32

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 34

Appendix I – Roles and Responsibilities by Federal Subcommittee .................................................. 38

Appendix II – Roles and responsibilities of actors in Operation Acolhida ......................................... 39

Appendix III – Table: Military activities in support of Humanitarian Relief Operations .................................................. 40

Appendix IV – Map: Brazil-Venezuela Border ....................................................................................... 41

Appendix V – Map: Humanitarian Logistic Task Force of Pacaraima (border with Venezuela) .................................................. 41
1 INTRODUCTION

Decades following the end of the Second World War have seen significant expansion in the number, type and size of humanitarian organizations as well as a proliferation of players acting in the humanitarian cause\(^1\). As a result, humanitarian crises responses have become social and highly political endeavors, shaped by actors, the people, institutions and contexts\(^2\). On the one hand, according to the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine there are no common definitions for humanitarian crisis\(^3\) and they usually “occur when the human, physical, economic or environmental damage from an event, or a series of events, overwhelms a community’s capacity to cope”\(^4\). On the other hand, crisis response can be understood as extraordinary collective measures to deal with extreme humanitarian emergencies from both national and international sources\(^5\). Consequently, current responses require differentiated approaches, ranging from a narrow interpretation of what constitutes humanitarian action and humanitarian actors to a more expansive, flexible and integrated form of relief\(^6\). Furthermore, analyzing actors involved on it is a highly important effort.

A main trait of crisis response nowadays is the role of the affected state. Over the years growing participation of affected states in some developing countries\(^7\) to respond to crises in their own territory has attracted attention due to these countries’ willingness and the ability to respond without external assistance\(^8\). Among them, China, Cuba, Egypt, Philippines, Brazil, Pakistan and India are a few examples of states that intend to respond by themselves since they are concerned with sovereignty claims\(^9\). These affected states tend do everything under their capacity to respond to the emergencies hitting their country\(^10\) and

\(^{1}\) Christina Bennett, “Time to let go. Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era”, ODI Humanitarian Policy Group, (2016): 4


\(^{3}\) “Health in Humanitarian Crisis”, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, see: https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/health-crises/0/steps/22887


\(^{5}\) Definition based on Hilhorst (2013: 5) and on Cristina Bennett (2016: 74-5)


\(^{7}\) I consider developing countries as those members of the G77 grouping and China. The G77 is the largest coalition of developing states composed of 132 nations. Harvey (2009): 12.


\(^{10}\) Affected states are more willing to respond by themselves as a result of their increasing wealth, their growing willingness and ability to respond to disasters without external assistance. Additionally, if an affected state does
therefore, rely as little as possible on international assistance, especially using their national military to respond. In this complex environment, the role and responsibilities of military actors are important to both humanitarian organizations and affected states. Thus, the main topic of this dissertation is to analyze challenges to national state response using military instruments.

In order to dig into the topic, there is a need to understand some concepts behind it. In my conceptual framework, I will work with two concepts. Firstly, I will discuss what crisis response refers to. For the sake of this research, I will clarify what type of crisis there are and the meaning of this concept to the humanitarian sector. Secondly, I will discuss the national military engagement in crisis response so to understand the new actors in the humanitarian ecosystem, as well as their roles and responsibilities. Lastly, in order to analyze if the involvement of national military assistance in humanitarian crisis was worthy to the response, I will discuss about its roles and responsibilities. This angle is important to measure the quality of the national military assistance in the long term and it will enable me to discuss challenges and limits to this approach.

There are two categories of actors in humanitarian response: formal actors and non-formal actors. Formal actors include the United Nations (UN), International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent\(^\text{11}\) Nevertheless, nowadays involvement of non-formal actors in the crisis response is increasing as state institutional capacity improves. Among those actors are national governments, military assets, private sector, affected communities, local NGOs and new donors\(^\text{12}\). Though these actors are not new to the response, they are gaining significant influence in the humanitarian ecosystem due to the shifting power dynamics in the humanitarian response that challenge the dominance of formal actors\(^\text{13}\).

Management, coordination and the level of engagement of these actors will depend on the type of crisis in place and also on the context of the emergency. There are nine different types of humanitarian crisis: large-scale involuntary migrations; state fragility: system failure; persecution of minorities/target groups; sudden-onset disasters caused by natural

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\(^{11}\) The future of aid INGOs in 2030: 6.

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p 6.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p 6.
hazards; epidemics; man-made destructive events; ecosystem crisis: ecosystem, regional destabilization, environmental, climactic, agricultural; protracted denial of service and economic crisis in middle-and-high-income countries. These different types of crises pose challenges to both formal and informal actors.

Yet the way the affected state will respond to the emergency will depend on the type of crisis and the context. When a crisis strikes a country, the affected state has the first and primary responsibility to respond, as said in the UN Humanitarian Resolution 46/182 of 1991:

Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.

Nowadays a main trait of humanitarian response is an increasing engagement of national military, especially in natural disaster situations. There are different cases to consider these actors' actions. In a non-conflict situation, for instance, national military usually is the first institution capable to assist in the emergency due its logistical capacity and expertise to respond with evacuation, transport and its capacity to reach difficulty areas. Several countries have been recognizing the military actors capabilities and therefore increasing their armed forces preparation and deployment as important capacities for their forces, such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – these countries refer to these operations respectively as “population support” (Australia), “peace support operations” (UK) and “complex contingency operations” (USA).

In a conflict context nonetheless the national military albeit capable is not an ideal option to respond first. In these cases, affected states tend to prefer a more neutral body to

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14 The future of aid INGOs in 2030.
19 There are two definitions of conflict that interests this dissertation. The first one is International Armed Conflict (IAC) referred to in Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, meaning a conflict between two or more states. The second one is Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) referred to in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, meaning armed conflicts not of international character occurring in the territory of one state. The Geneva Convention of 1949, available at https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf
work on the assistance since the national military might be part of the conflict or have strong interests in it. As in the case of Pakistan when ongoing tensions and insecurity in many westerns parts of the country required a more neutral humanitarian response rather than a military involvement\(^{20}\). Understanding these dilemmas and particularities of employing national military assistance in time of crisis is important to rethink humanitarian response in a context of growing willingness of affected states to respond by themselves. The need to rethink comes from the idea that there is a shift in the humanitarian action every decade since the end of the Second World War\(^{21}\). Humanitarian organizations are obliged to produce constant changes due to the speed and scale of changes in the international community in order to remain effective in fulfilling their mandate\(^{22}\). As an example of the importance to rethink humanitarian response comes from “the recent Ebola crisis in West Africa, where lessons from past crises and established humanitarian good practice did little to prevent response failures that may have contributed to the spread of the disease”\(^{23}\).

Generally, the use of national military assistance in crisis could be explained by the armed forces capacity, rapid mobilization, deployment of unique assets and expertise\(^{24}\) but could also be a mechanism used by affected governments to overcome national inability to respond. Considering their increased engagement in the first phase of the response\(^{25}\) it would be interesting to comprehend until which phase this assistance works to analyze the existence of challenges as its levels. This angle is important because each time affected states are willing to respond by themselves, they rely on national capacity, which is the national military or national and local agencies with the participation of the national military. As in the case of the Philippines that has National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council which is the primary body responsible for coordinating preparedness, response,


\(^{24}\) OCHA on Message: UN-CMCoord, 2017

prevention and mitigation, and rehabilitation and recovery and has the Secretary of Department of National Defense occupying the high level of the structure.  

Thereby it is important to understand the roles and responsibilities of national military in the assistance since the institution is working in a humanitarian environment but are not fully guided by humanitarian principles. In the case of the response to disasters in Pakistan, for instance, though the army was the only actor with enough capacity to respond immediately, military personnel had to attend training workshops on principles, standards and indicators in the provision of emergency response provided by the Sphere and HAP-I Pakistan focal points. This shows the military are not primarily prepared to respond to humanitarian crisis but when demanded they have to be adapted to it.

Therefore, studying motivations and principles of military when working in the humanitarian ecosystem is essential in the current context. As an example, Pakistan’s Constitution assigns post-disaster relief and rehabilitation functions to the civil administration which has the responsibility to request military involvement and the military’s mandate will then be assigned according to the specific disaster. However, the reality during the earthquake response was far removed from the constitutional arrangements. During the relief response, justifications that the local civilian administration capacity had been crippled during the earthquake ensured that the military had control over all rescue operations.

To respond to India's earthquake in 2001, the national army played a central role in providing relief to the operations with their vehicles and specialized equipment. In the first two days after the disaster, the army rescued 478 people, evacuated 484 other injured people and recovered over 2260 corpses.

If, on the one hand, employing the military mandate defined by the affected state could be useful at first, on the other hand, it could also be dangerous and jeopardize the entire response, putting more people in vulnerable situations. This is because the affected state could have a different agenda and different interests on the emergency in comparison with humanitarian organizations working in the response. Once again, the disaster response in India it is a good example of the government motivations behind the emergency response. As an example, in the response of the tsunami in 2004, the military has traditionally played

an important role in disaster response\textsuperscript{30}, but internal political instability in the country between two political parties caused a misuse of the military:

The use of the military had a political dimension. In early January the main opposition party in the central government, asked for the military to be placed in charge of erecting temporary shelters for fishing communities. The central government rejected suggestions that the military should be placed in charge of the response effort, preferring the lead role to remain with the state government primarily because the scale of the disaster was less than in the case of the Gujarat earthquake\textsuperscript{31}.

An interesting case is Latin America. Since it is historically a region of low interstate conflict but with a history of military involvement in politics and national development, the relationship between the military and society has always been an important question. After the Cold War and these countries transition to democracy, what to do with its military has been a pressing question to these countries\textsuperscript{32}, as it was to Brazil. Several countries engaged their military on counter drug trafficking, counter-guerrilla or public security missions\textsuperscript{33} but also raised their involvement in the response to natural disasters. Recently, with the growing fluxes of migrants to the region due to the political, economic and social crisis in Venezuela -- especially after 2017 -- many of these states are trying to respond by themselves the best they can with some of them, the case of Brazil, employing their national military on the response.

Lastly, a central aspect of the use of national military in crisis response is to analyze the challenges and limits of the national military operation in the emergency assistance. For that, one needs to consider how the military is employed in the response phase, such as relief and rehabilitation, and in the development phase to see if the military assistance is engaged in the entire cycle of the response. Through this analysis it will be possible to evaluate the challenges to the response using national military assistance. Firstly, because there should be a proper discussion around the use of national military assistance in the humanitarian crisis response, to better understand its role and responsibilities in the ecosystem. Secondly, to contribute to the debate that already exists that the humanitarian assistance should be thought in the long-term and in a sustainable way since some highlight that the capacity of the military

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p 19.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p 20.
to provide a humanitarian response can be questioned, despite its superior capacity in terms of logistics, manpower and organization efficiency\(^{34}\).

1.1 Research Question, Methodology and Limitations

The primary goal of this research is to analyze challenges and limits of affected states on the use of national military in times of crisis. My research question is: *what are the challenges and limits for the response when using national military in times of crisis?* This question will enable me to understand the proper roles and responsibilities of the national military assistance in the emergency response. By analyzing challenges and limits of military deployment in crisis I will also be able to understand which phase of these operations armed forces should play a role. I will use a single-country case study methodology to support my analysis in order to make inferences that go beyond my case and provide more evidence for my research\(^{35}\).

As for my case study select method, I aimed to choose an uncommon case in the literature. Generally, humanitarian studies on the use of national military are focused on natural disasters, such as Graham Heaslip and Elizabeth Barber\(^{36}\), Deon Canyon et alii\(^{37}\), Alexander Nicoll\(^{38}\), Sebbah et alii\(^{39}\), Tatham\(^{40}\), and Bayman et alii\(^{41}\). Differently, my case refers to the use of national military in a humanitarian crisis. Additionally, I aimed not to focus on humanitarian crisis related to conflict areas, since in most of these cases the national authority is part of the conflict employing military as combatants\(^{42}\) thus lines between the


national government intentions with the national military asset would be blurred. Therefore, national governments would not be focused mainly on the assistance but rather in the conflict as emphasized by Doel\textsuperscript{43} and Oliker et alli\textsuperscript{44}. Thus, I chose the case of Brazil during the Venezuelan migration crisis (2017-2019). My case presents an affected state facing a refugee crisis and to which this problem is a relatively new issue. Brazilian national military is playing a major role in the response and has been coordinating with several other government agencies. Moreover, the national military (mainly the army) is working in the response to the refugee crisis in the country along with other national, local and international organizations such as the IOM, the UNHCR and other UN agencies.

My analytical grid will be based on three combined frameworks. Firstly, the linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) response cycle. The concept was originated in the 1980s when practitioners and scholars identified a gap between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development activities\textsuperscript{45}. The idea is to link short-term relief measures with longer-term development efforts so to create synergies and provide a more sustainable response to crisis situations, moving from a continuum sequence of phases to a contiguum sequence -- a scenario of simultaneous and complementary use of different aid instruments\textsuperscript{46}. However, the analysis will not be focused in the LRRD itself but rather on its time framework of relief, rehabilitation and development in order to discuss until which phase of the response the national military assistance plays a role.

My second framework will be the military disaster response cycle in humanitarian relief operations provided by Sebbah et alli. According to the authors, humanitarian relief operations are different from traditional military missions and can be divided in three phases: (1) Lifesaving phase, (2) Stabilization phase, and (3) Recovery phase\textsuperscript{47} (see table 1). This provides an overview of humanitarian operations from the military side.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p 4.
Table: Military humanitarian relief mission cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life Saving Phase</td>
<td>Getting access to the field and setting up operations as fast as possible is the highest main objective. During this phase, the military participates in traditional and non-traditional operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization Phase</td>
<td>During this phase, agencies focus in implementing their programs, while cost and efficiencies gain importance. Activities such as delivery of food and medical aid, development of local capacities such as water and sanitation, and the construction of emergency shelters, are among the activities aimed to stabilize the affected crisis areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Phase</td>
<td>Agencies are focusing on their exit strategy including transferring of operations to local actors. Rehabilitation and reconstruction activities aimed at community self-sufficiency and restoration of local/ national governance are the ultimate activities of the disaster response cycle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


My third framework will be the classification of the military support provided by Sebbah et alli that is based on the degree of participation of the military in the relief efforts of the humanitarian response. According to the authors, there are three levels of participation of the military assets as following: (1) Direct Support when the military forces are highly involved in the peer-to-peer distribution of supplies and services to the affected population, (2) Indirect Support featured by activities of support to agencies involved in distribution of goods, such as transporting relief goods, security, and protection to humanitarian activities. This engagement is more common in hostile areas where the military support is required to protect convoys and ensure the security of personnel, (3) Infrastructure Support of providing services such as roads and bridges repair, airspace management, water, and power generation to affected population and humanitarian organizations. This classification will provide me with the resources to understand how the military is acting in my case study and therefore analyze their role in the LRRD response cycle and the military humanitarian relief missions cycle.

Combining these three frameworks, I will divide my analysis on two integrated levels. On the strategic level, I will focus on understanding roles, responsibilities and principles to respond and until what level the national military assistance goes in the specific case. As for

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the operation level, I will mainly discuss challenges and limits faced by the affected state when using national military assets in the response.

The research materials will be peer-reviewed articles, scholarly books, policy papers from research institutions and, for my case study, governmental materials, newspaper articles, opinion papers and analyses from organizations regarding the Operation Acolhida led by the Brazilian military in coordination with organizations and government agencies. The main limitations of my dissertation are the following: (1) small number of peer-review articles and scholarly books on the topic of use of national military in crisis response by affected states during humanitarian crisis, (2) a case study that still does not have many peer-reviewed articles, books or dissertations about due to the fact of it being very recent.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Crisis response and roles and responsibilities of national military

Humanitarian aid started its modern history in the nineteenth century as a way of relief during an international crisis and has been evolving and restructuring considerably in the last twenty years. There are different perspectives to what these crises refers to. Dorothea Hilhorst, for instance, understands crisis as events requiring extraordinary measures and often outside interventions whereas the WHO defines it as “an event or series of events representing a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community, usually over a wide area.”

These differences reflect many points of view on how to think about crisis response. In its discussion of minimum standards in humanitarian response, the Sphere Association highlights that an “effective humanitarian response must address people’s needs holistically, and sectors should coordinate and collaborate with each other to do so.” In contrast with Sphere’s proposition in which people’s needs are in the center of the response, Paul Harvey reinforces that in the disaster relief, for example, the assistance is constructed with a ‘state-

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49 It is important to highlight that there are no peer-reviewed articles or scholarly books on my case study since it is a very new topic.
centric’ perspective that defines the purpose and the mechanisms by which the aid would be delivered. Others, such as the Center for Global Development proposes that “humanitarian response aspires to be demand-driven: oriented around and responsive to the prerogatives of the vulnerable people it serves”.

These nuances in the definition of humanitarian crisis and in the role of its response brings up many challenges in the assistance. Authors as Harmer, Adele and Wheeler Victoria; The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative and Harvey and Paul highlighted the main challenge in the crisis response as the fact that the affected state has the primary responsibility in the response. For them, the way the affected state envisages the crisis influence their response.

Another challenge is when within the context of the emergency each actor involved on it interprets and define it differently, consequently, will act differently with also a diverse interest. Hilhorst and Bankoff found in their study that “in the Philippines the government and oppositional non-government organizations (NGOs) ran parallel disaster response mechanisms, including programs for DRR. The two systems did not interact or coordinate and were basically competing claims to the support of the population”. This not only jeopardizes the assistance, because each actor has a diverse interest in the response and use different mechanisms to it, but also confuses the affected population that does not know where to rely.

When authors intend to examine the local response over the affected states in an emergency, they rely on the discussion about humanitarian crisis response in conflicts or natural disasters. Authors, such as Harvey and Paul; Bhatt and Mihir, and Price Gareth focused their debate of crisis response into the roles and responsibilities of the affected state.

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58 Disaster Risk Reduction.
throughout the natural disaster emergency, emphasizing the mechanisms used by local
governments to respond to it. These mechanisms go from the local capacity of the affected
state or on the international cooperation with international organizations or foreign military
assets. Still the majority of the literature focuses on the discussion of the local capacity to
respond especially because nowadays the affected states prefer to respond by themselves to
crisis inside their borders\textsuperscript{62}.

The ODI HPG Group has produced several articles debating and analyzing the roles
and responsibilities of the affected states to respond to natural disasters, such as the studies
from Cochrane and Harriet\textsuperscript{63}, and Gordon et all\textsuperscript{64}. The topics range from discussing roles of
affected state through case studies and present challenges to the coordination of civil and
military actors in humanitarian action. Bhatt and Price\textsuperscript{65}, for instance, exemplify the affected
state response to natural disaster with the case study of India. This approach is due to the
country’s vulnerability to suffer from many natural disasters and also due to its local
government important role in the management of the response. To the authors, the
government of India responded to the disasters immediately, managing it with government
agencies and NGOs with the coordination of the Natural Disaster Management Control Room
in Delhi\textsuperscript{66}. Another interesting point regarding the response management in India is the fact
that district of Kutch that suffered from an earthquake in January 2001, has a disputed border
with Pakistan. The large number of military personnel based in the area and their expertise
with specialized equipment helped with a rapid response in the region. The coordination of
the response between the army and the national and international organizations seem to work
very well in Kutch and other regions of India. In Ahmedabad and Bhuj the army coordinated
with the local government to receive international aid. “The military and civilian responses
were coordinated at both the central and the state levels, encompassing relief supply

\textsuperscript{62} The Future of Aid INGOs in 2030: 16.

\textsuperscript{63} Harriet Cochrane, “The role of the affected state in humanitarian action: a case study on Pakistan”, ODI

\textsuperscript{64} Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom, and Stuart Gordon, “Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-

\textsuperscript{65} Gareth Price and Mihir Bhatt, “The role of the affected state in humanitarian action: a case study of India”,

\textsuperscript{66} The Natural Disaster Management Control Room is part of the Indian Natural Disaster Management
Authority agency, www.ndma.gov.in.
coordination, loss assessment, relief needs assessment and removal of debris from roadways”.

Pakistan represents the opposite scenario of the good relations among military, civil society and state in disaster response. “The presence of a strong, functioning, albeit military, state is not the usual context for humanitarian actors, and it has taken some time for a productive relationship to be formed between international NGOs and UN agencies with the Government and relevant authorities.” To prove its capacity to respond to local natural disasters Pakistan state created in 2007 the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) but found difficulties in its own capacity to respond to the floods that hit the country in 2007. Additionally, the fact that the international humanitarian community has showed reluctance over the years to accept the primary responsibility of the Pakistan local authority in responding to emergencies within the country’s borders make more difficult the success of the local response to natural disasters.

The Pakistan scenario is very challenging for the international humanitarian agencies due to the state’s power and influence within its borders. While in some other contexts, like in India, the international humanitarian community has the opportunity to be more active and to gain more experience, this approach is not possible in many cases of disaster response in Pakistan. The Pakistan characteristic of being a strong sovereign state, made the country focus in strengthening its own local capacity throughout the years in areas such as disaster preparedness and mitigation, making the government disaster response more effective over the decades. However, there are still challenges and complexities on the coordination between national and local government and between the military and civilian administration. Nonetheless, in both scenarios, the Indian and Pakistan governments were able, over the years, to strengthen its local capacity creating national agencies in order to improve its response.

Hence, the context where the humanitarian crisis occurs it is directly related with the way the response will be conducted. Each type of crisis and each characteristic of the affected

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69 *The Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)* is an autonomous and constitutionally established federal authority to deal and manage local disasters. See: www.ndma.gov.pk.
state will demand different strategies and management of the response. Furthermore, the local capacity and the local mechanisms of the affected state such as national agencies, national humanitarian organizations, national military forces and national government agencies will influence the humanitarian crisis response. Generally, “local governments are eager to show their populations and the international community that they can manage situations of humanitarian need on their own, shunning foreign intervention to increase their independence and legitimacy”71.

2.2 Informal actors in humanitarian response: the role of national military
With an expected increase in the magnitude and frequency of deadly storms, it is reasonable to assume that militaries will be increasingly called upon to participate in the delivery of relief to populations affected by large-scale natural disasters, conflicts, or complex emergencies72. Additionally, the humanitarian response has been increasingly within remit of new actors, that usually have other ways of operating that often differ from the traditional approaches and not necessarily based on humanitarian principles73.

The humanitarian ecosystem includes all the actors who participate in and contribute to humanitarian action, it also encompasses competing power structures and actors with diverse roles and understanding of what it is to be a humanitarian74. As it is evident, actors engaged in emergencies plays an important role and each one of them has a specific responsibility in the crisis response scenario.

On the one hand, within the formal humanitarian sector classification are those actors that somehow shaped the humanitarian work in their primary essence. Those institutions are the core and the beginning of the international humanitarian action, moreover, they gave to the humanitarian ecosystem the traditional humanitarian principles which are the bases to every crisis response. “These actors include the United Nations (UN), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the traditional donor governments such as those in the OECD-Development Assistance Committee”75.

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71 The future of aid INGOs in 2030: 16.
72 The need for evidence-based assessments of the effectiveness of civil-military coordination in humanitarian response, march, 2015.
74 The future of aid INGOs in 2030, 6.
On the other hand, the non-formal actors are those institutions that operate in the edges of the formal humanitarian sector and are gaining progressively in influence and importance inside the humanitarian response umbrella. Among those actors are national governments, military assets, private sector, affected communities, local NGOs and new donors. The motivation behind the engagement of non-formal actors in the response are many. “In the past, when the formal humanitarian sector has been in crisis – in the aftermath of the both World Wars, for instance, and, more recently, in the Biafra War and following the Rwandan genocide – new humanitarian actors have appeared.” This clarification between formal actors and non-formal actors inside the humanitarian assistance is important to this study because my main discussion is the use of national military, a non-formal actor, in the humanitarian crisis response. Therefore, I understand it is important to distinguish both definitions.

Many challenges appear while discussing the use of military assistance in the humanitarian scenario, such as the motivations of the affected state with this use, the principles that will guide this use and the coordination of the response between military and organizations and government. The report Future of Aid INGOs in 2030 highlight this issue when it raises awareness of humanitarian community to the blurred definition of who is part of the humanitarian ecosystem with the arrival of the new actors in the scene.

The use of national military assistance to help in the response of natural disasters is a very well-known phenomenon. According to Harvey, “the military forces of affected states have played an important role in responding to natural disasters in many contexts.” Among the reasons why affected states decided to use military assistance in the disaster response is the institution’s capacity to access difficult areas, its logistical, coordination, communication skills and support with medicines, tools and equipment and security, along with the fact that they are decision-making driven.

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76 Ibid, p 6.
77 Ibid, p 7.
78 Ibid, p 11.
When military assets are deployed in disaster areas, they often carry out humanitarian tasks or they provide support to other agencies involved in the humanitarian relief. The activities range from the distribution of provision to simply providing security to organizations\textsuperscript{82}. Among the activities, there are the provision of latrine construction, establishment of radio and satellite communication, field engineering, road and airfields construction, field hospital, tactical support, mine clearing, etc. To find detailed description of activities, please see appendix III.

Yet, humanitarian organizations still have problems accepting local military support and distrust motivations behind military deployment in humanitarian scenarios. As an example, the use of military assets in the humanitarian response in Kosovo also had political motivations behind the huge amount of military resources and personnel deployed in building and running camps for displaced populations and other humanitarian activities\textsuperscript{83}.

Another reason behind motivations and the increased participation of military assistance in crisis response is related to the fact that the humanitarian system cannot deal alone with the huge number of different disasters that are hitting the world anymore, such as natural disasters, protracted crisis, migration flow and internal displaced people (IDPS). “In many countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, this gap is resolved by using professionals in various security sectors who are the primary responders in the event of a disaster, such as military personnel”. \textsuperscript{84} The Philippines, for instance, has a long history of using military assistance to respond to crisis, especially natural disasters emergencies. The country “[…] is highly disaster prone due to its geographic location been exposure to a range of natural hazards such as typhoons, landslides and monsoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis”\textsuperscript{85}.

Additionally, the military forces in the region play an important role and have a huge responsibility and infrastructure to respond to humanitarian crisis. The Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies report highlights that huge and frequent disasters in


\textsuperscript{84} Frederick Burkle, Benjamin Ryan, Dean Canyon, “Military provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in non-conflict crises”, (2017): 1.

the Philippines have shaped the evolution of legislation regarding management and coordination of military assistance. "The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is a primary responder in disaster operations and has been deployed on a frequent basis to disasters in recent years. The Philippines has also been a strong advocate for the advancement of civil-military coordination in the region.

After the military response to the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in 2013 it was established six key recommendations for the civil-military coordination in disaster response to improve even more the operation. Which are: 1) Establish a humanitarian civil-military coordination mechanism at the national level; 2) Institutionalize a humanitarian civil-military coordination capacity in domestic and international rapid response mechanisms; 3) Deploy FMA with competent liaison officers; 4) Adopt a co-location strategy for humanitarian civil-military coordination; 5) Establish a simple, transparent tracking system for the use of FMA; 6) Invest in humanitarian civil-military coordination capacity-building.

Furthermore, the country has a specific agency, as India and Pakistan, called National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council established in 2010 that coordinates all the humanitarian operation, since the preparedness, going through response, prevention and mitigation until rehabilitation and recovery. The agency is composed of 44 member agencies including, officials from 14 government departments; AFP and PNP; the Philippines National Red Cross and other civil society organizations; provincial and local governments; social security and insurance organizations; national commissions and councils; and one representative from the private sector. Along with these agencies is also the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Moreover, this agency functions in national, regional and local levels with the names National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (RDRRMC) and

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87 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are the military forces of the Philippines.
89 Foreign Military Assets (FMA).
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils/Office (LDRRMC/O), respectively\(^{92}\).

There are not many articles focusing on the discussion of the use of national militaries in crisis response. The majority of literature prefers to discuss about foreign military interventions in states. For instance, there are the Oslo Guidelines\(^{93}\) for the UN-CMCoord\(^{94}\) that “were developed to fill the humanitarian gap between the disaster needs that the international community is asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet these needs”. These Guidelines were focused in affected states that have accepted or request the assistance of foreign military assets (FMA) to respond to its humanitarian emergency.

One of the challenges that has been discussed over time about the interaction between humanitarian organizations and military forces is the difficulty in their relationship in the field, specially related with the organizations’ doubts about the motivations behind the use of military assets in the humanitarian response. In the international humanitarian law\(^{95}\) and in the foundations of the Red Cross it is possible to find the basis of the relationship between civilian and military forces. They set the rules of the engagement between both actors related to the fact that relief should be provided to those in need regardless of the war’s aims.

Moreover, related with the concern between humanitarian principles and military assistance the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief\(^{96}\), have emphasized the independence of humanitarian action from political or military goals\(^{97}\). Most of the time, in the field, humanitarian organizations accuse military forces of have different interests instead the humanitarian ones. In the Pakistan response of one of its natural disasters, the humanitarian organizations accused the military forces of carrying out assessment without any type of democracy, participation or

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\(^{93}\) Oslo Guidelines address the use of foreign military assets following natural, technological and environmental emergencies in times of peace. UN-CMCoord Field Handbook version 2.0, 2018: 55

\(^{94}\) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and pursue common goals. Focused on the mobilization of foreign military assets (FMA). UN-CMCoord Field Handbook version 2.0, (2018): 53.

\(^{95}\) The International Humanitarian Law is the legal framework applicable to situations of armed conflict and occupation

\(^{96}\) The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires.

respected means with the local community. Additionally, militaries were accused of prioritizing evacuation of military personnel when reaching affected areas along with the fact that they refused more help from India, what could have doubled the rescue capacity ⁹⁸.

One of the reasons why the military was accused in the Pakistan context of putting aside the community participation in the assessment could be justified by their decision-making characteristic also for the fact that they have different interests and principles that sometimes cannot be reconciled with humanitarian work. The fact that they are driven to solving problems efficiently and fast, set aside the community participation in the process, making it difficult to have their voices heard and their problems solved. Another aspect it is the fact that the military force is not training under humanitarian principles and guides. They are trained to receive and to execute orders, to have a strong logistic capacity and to be driven to solve problems. Those principles are different from the humanitarian ones, which makes the relation and the interaction between military forces and humanitarian organizations in the filed a difficult task. Notwithstanding, these differences and difficulties cannot be an excuse for the bad management in the response. Especially because, affected states increasingly are using more national military to respond and when it is not efficient the affected population are the ones who suffer more. “The key, overarching and widely documented challenge facing civil-military interaction concerns the tension between the neutral and impartial provision of humanitarian assistance and the political and strategic objectives of military forces and the governments that direct them” ⁹⁹.

2.3 Military assistance in Latin America

In Latin America, national militaries forces are very used by states to deal with internal and domestic issues and had a major role in these societies and politics ¹⁰⁰. Nowadays democratic governments in Latin America no longer expect military forces to act autonomously towards political stabilization of society by rather to fulfill strategic objectives ¹⁰¹. Additionally, in a democracy the decision on the use of the military assistance falls under the elected president of the affected state. The military roles are to execute the mission in ways that will achieve the ends sought by governments. In other words, mandates are defined by the

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political leadership, so that governments are the decision-makers and the armed forces are the decision-executors.\footnote{David Pion-Berlin, “Military missions in democratic Latin America”, (2016): 12.}

The increasingly use of national military assets in humanitarian crisis response by Latin America governments could be understanding due to the lack of armed conflicts in the region\footnote{David Pion-Berlin, & Harold Trinkunas, “Attention-deficits: why politicians ignore defence in Latin America”, Latin American Research Review, (2007), v. 42 (3).}. Besides the lack of armed conflicts in the region, the national military forces are an institution with a significant structure, ready to be used, with an enormous capacity to immediately respond to emergencies. Nonetheless, this preference in the long-term also brings challenges and for the local and national capacity, linked with the dependency in the national military institution. Which means that the affected governments tend to rely on the military expertise to carry out domestic assignments instead of improving other national institutions that could increase the assistance. As Pion-Berlin emphasizes, the excessive use of military could foster complacency on the part of politicians, causing them to rely too much on the military and defer plans to building up civilian agencies capable of stepping into replace soldiers\footnote{David Pion-Berlin, “Military missions in democratic Latin America”, (2016): 26.}. This tendency can bring challenges in the long-term assistance, while the crisis needs more expertise in the other phases of the response than only the military one.

Once again, there is a debate that military forces are not trained to deal with humanitarian crisis neither should be the best choice to deal with them especially internally depending on the nature of the mission. In Colombia, for example, soldiers had been guilty of some 1700 extrajudicial executions of civilians disguised in guerrilla fatigues to appear as combatants. Counter-gang and counter-crime operations in Brazil and in Central America have likewise been marred by human rights violations\footnote{David Pion-Berlin, “Military missions in democratic Latin America”, (2016): 25\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106}}}. This violation is directly related with the principle of the international humanitarian law\footnote{Customary Law, International humanitarian law – Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. See: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1#Fn_2751A916_00010} that highlights that civilians should not be targeted in conflicts. The issue faced in Colombia emphasizes the debate that military forces do not have the same principles of humanitarian organizations likewise should not be used to respond to crisis.

Pion-Berlin still inquires if the military could be utilized to solve domestic problems while mitigate harm, additionally, also emphasizes that the military forces should always be
assessed in comparison with some other alternative\textsuperscript{107}. Which means, that affected
governments should always analyze all the real state capacity to respond to any crisis, before
choosing military forces to do the assistance. As said before, the use of military assistance
will depend on the type of crisis, the characteristic of the affected state and more important
its used should be based on the state capacity to respond to the emergency in the long-term.

3 DISCUSSION: NATIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE

In this section I will analyze more deeply the challenges and limits of the use of the national
military assistance in time of crisis through my case study of Operation Acolhida. On the
first sub-section I will present my case and on the second sub-section I will analyze through
the analytical grid of the LRRD timeframe, the military disaster response cycle and the
military classification of support.

3.1 Case Study: Operation Acolhida

The crisis in Venezuela has been escalating since the death of its previous president Hugo
Chávez in 2013\textsuperscript{108}. With the election of his successor Nicolás Maduro in 2013 the country
has faced tensions between the government party and the opposition\textsuperscript{109}. Additionally, the
crisis has reached its peak in 2019 when Venezuela has also faced pressure from the
international community that does not agree with political changes made by the
government\textsuperscript{110}.

The country faces the biggest recession of its history and additional twelve months of
economic retraction\textsuperscript{111}. Among the reasons that contributed with the Venezuela’s situation is
the fact that the country depends too much on its oil exports, and in 2014 with the dollar’s
devaluation, the price of the mineral felt too. Additionally, the previous country
administration was focused on exporting oil and was not concerned in developing its
agricultural industry which made Venezuela more dependent on imports of its primary
products. Moreover, the country faced hyperinflation, political crisis resulting in protests

\textsuperscript{107} David Pion-Berlin, “Military missions in democratic Latin America”, (2016): 27
america-19652436
\textsuperscript{109} Peter Millard, Cindy Hoffman, Marisa Gertz, “A Timeline of Venezuela’s Economic Rise and Fall”,
\textsuperscript{110} Peter Millard, Cindy Hoffman, Marisa Gertz, “A Timeline of Venezuela’s Economic Rise and Fall”,
\textsuperscript{111} Felipe Corazza and Ligia Mesquita, “Crise na Venezuela, o que levou o país...”, BBC News, April 30, 2019.
around the country and the strong military involvement in the government administration and a strict media control.\(^{112}\)

The biggest problem of Venezuela is its dependency of imports and the international pressure over the country’s government. Part of the international community is against the Nicolás Maduro’s administration and puts economic pressure on the government hampering the country’s importation of primary products. Over this fact, the population has fled Venezuela to other Latin America countries such as Colombia, Peru and Brazil in searching for more opportunities and to access to primary products.

According to UNHCR, the number of Venezuelan migrants, refugees and asylum seekers that have fled the country is 4,054,870\(^{113}\) million. Among the countries that have granted residency status for them there are Colombia with 672,947 followed by Peru with 410,895; Chile with 326,775; Argentina 154,679; Ecuador with 99,583; Brazil with 68,499; Panama with 63,102; Mexico with 48,955; Uruguay with 12,838; Canada with 5,708; Costa Rica with 5,600 and Paraguay with 973 with a total of 1,870,551 migrants in regular status or with permits of residency\(^{114}\). Colombia is the country that hosted the majority of Venezuelan migrants with 1,408,055 million being them 48% women and 52% men\(^{115}\). Peru is the second country that hosted more Venezuelans migrants and refugees with a total of 806,875. Brazil is the fifth country that have hosted more Venezuelans migrants and refugees with a total of 168,357; 99,858 asylum seekers and 68,499 issued residencies\(^{116}\).

Although Brazil is not the first choice of the Venezuelan’s migrants, the migration had a significant impact in the country. This impact is due to the fact that Roraima, the state in the border with Venezuela and when the migrants get into the country, is one of the poorest and distant regions of Brazil. Among the 27 states that compose the Federative Republic of Brazil, Roraima has the lowest GDP in 2016 with a net value of R$ 11,011 million. This is a very low number in comparison with Brazil’s richest state is São Paulo (R$ 2,038,005 million) and the second richest state, Rio de Janeiro (R$ 640,186 million)\(^{117}\). Roraima is also

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\(^{113}\) Data from: Portal Operacional, “Refugiados y migrantes de Venezuela”, UNHCR, July 5th, 2019.

\(^{114}\) Data from: Portal Operacional, “Refugiados y migrantes de Venezuela”, UNHCR, June 5th, 2019.

\(^{115}\) Data from: GIFMM Colombia, July 31st, 2019.

\(^{116}\) Data from: Coordination Platform for refugees and migrants from Venezuela, UNHCR, August 5th, 2019. See: https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform.

the least populated state of the country with a total population of 576,568 people and a
demographic density of 2.57 inhabitants per square kilometer\textsuperscript{118}.

When arriving in Brazil, migrants were divided in two main cities in the state Boa
Vista the capital of the state and Pacaraima at the border with Venezuela. There are in total
thirteen shelters between these two cities, eleven in Boa Vista and two in Pacaraima. The
total capacity of the shelters is 6.196 people and there are 5.723 migrants living on them. The
biggest shelter calls Rodon III in Boa Vista with a capacity of 1000 people however there are
only 370 people living there. In contrast Rodon I has a capacity of 726 but it is the most
crowded shelter with 801 people living there\textsuperscript{119}. Among these shelters there are two
specifically for indigenous called Pintolândia in Boa Vista and Janokoida in Pacaraima with
a total of 1.098 indigenous living on them.

Among the activities provided in the shelters there are three meals per day, food
distribution in indigenous shelters, distribution of personal hygiene kits and diapers, daily
cleaning, Portuguese classes, children’s activities, cultural activities, supply of raw material
for Warao\textsuperscript{120} indigenous, international calls to Venezuela, human rights and 24h particular
security\textsuperscript{121}.

At the beginning of the Venezuelan migration flow the Brazilian government was not
participating in the reception operation of migrants and the local government of Roraima had
to deal with the situation alone. The low capacity of the local government of Roraima to
respond to the migration flow made the region to face a significant crisis where migrants
started to camp on the streets and in squares in Boa Vista. Due to this intensive migration
flow to Roraima, the region was “facing a significant impact in its public services, expanding
the local demand for social assistance, health and security”\textsuperscript{122}. According to the International
Traffic System (STI), since 2017 the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela reached its peak,
Brazil has received 415.369 Venezuelan migrants. 54,6% of these migrants are men and
45,5% are female. Over this number, 178.557 decided to stay in Brazil and among them,
103.697 asked for recognition of refugee status and 74.860 asked for recognition of
residence\textsuperscript{123}.

\textsuperscript{118} Data from: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). See:
\textsuperscript{119} Data from: 8ª reunião comitê federal de assistência emergencial, Civil House, December 2018.
\textsuperscript{120} Indigenous ethnicity from Venezuela.
\textsuperscript{121} Data from: 8ª reunião comitê federal de assistência emergencial, Civil House, December 2018.
\textsuperscript{122} Assistência Emergencial aos Imigrantes Venezuelanos, Operação Acolhida, Civil House.
This great migrant flow generated several problems in the region. At early 2018, for instance, the state governor even asked Supreme Court to close permanently the borders between the two countries, a course of action rejected by the Brazilian government

According with Camila Asano, program coordinator at Conectas a national organization, the competence of the migration reception is a “federal issue, shared with states and municipalities. But until the beginning of the Operation Acolhida the Federal Government acted in a timely manner, leaving everything to the local government of Roraima and the municipalities. The Operation Acolhida was well welcomed, albeit late”

Since March 2018, the Brazilian government along with national and governmental agencies, military forces, civil society entities and international organizations has launched the Operation Acolhida in the Brazilian northern cities of Boa Vista and Pacaraima. According to the assistant coordinator of the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force of Roraima, colonel of the Brazilian Army, Georges Kannan, the Operation Acolhida is an unprecedented interagencies humanitarian operation for Brazilian Armed Forces. According to him, there was no previous model and the Brazilian Army had to have a lot of creativity and work with the UNHCR and national ministries. At the same time several organizations, were concerned about the use of the Brazilian armed forces in the operation. According to Camila Asano, from Conectas:

When it was established, the main criticism was the militarized response. It was established that it would be an inter-ministerial operation, however there was a preponderance of the Ministry of Defense, in the context of the Michel Temer’s Government in which various aspects of the public life in Brazil were being militarized.

Operation Acolhida carries out different activities and responds to emergencies to meet ten priority areas: social protection and health care; promotion of educational activities;

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126 Welcome Operation or Operation Shelter in a free translation.


professional qualification and training; guaranteeing human rights; protection of women, children, teenagers, the elderly, the disabled, indigenous population, and traditional communities; infrastructure and sanitation supply; public safety and border control strengthening; logistics and distribution of supplies; mobility, distribution within the national territory and relocation support”

One of the main characteristics of the Operation Acolhida, and probably what increases its success, is a partnership between the Brazilian central government and national ministers from many social areas that aggregates in the capacity of the operation. Each one of these ministers has its own main focus in the response and works to fulfill the most demanding areas. The Figure below illustrates the governance of Operation Acolhida, showing how governmental agencies are divided into four Subcommittees for the response: (1) Reception, identification and sorting of migrants, (2) Relocation of migrants, (3) Health Activities, (4) Reception of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations.

These Subcommittees were created on February 15th, 2018 by the President of the Republic as part of the Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance to assist people in vulnerable situations due to migratory flow provoked by humanitarian crisis. This federal task force consisted of the several Ministries: Civil House of the Presidency of the Republic; Minister of Justice and Public Security; Minister of Defense; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Minister of Education; Minister of Labour; Minister of Social Development; Minister of Health; Minister of Planning, Development and Management; Minister of National Integration; Minister of Human Rights; Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic. Resolutions of Civil House, the formal coordinator of Operation Acolhida, defined roles and responsibilities of actors as presented by the two tables below. To see detailed activities of each Minister, please see Appendix I.

An important part of the operation is the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force. This is the fieldwork part of the operation and contains a Reception and Identification Station, Migrant Sorting Station (PTrig), Advanced Service Station (PAA) and a Support Zone, as shown in the figure in the Appendix II. These five different levels range from reception,

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132 Civil House (Casa Civil) responsible for coordinating governmental actions.
133 Brazilian central coordinator of the intelligence system.
134 From Portuguese, Posto de Triagem.
identification and immunization of the migrants, the establishment of common areas, dining halls and sanitary installations. These installations are managed by Brazilian military forces along with federal agencies and international organizations. Each agency is responsible for one level and has its own roles and responsibilities. For instance, the Federal Police is responsible for identification and migration control on the border with Venezuela, the UNHCR and IOM are responsible for biometric register and migratory regularization, UNICEF is responsible for children's activities, ICRC is responsible for managing international calls to Venezuela and the Minister of Human Rights and the UNFPA are responsible for human rights.\(^\text{135}\)

As part of the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force, the Ministry of Defense has taken over the Executive Secretariat and the General Eduardo Pazuello was nominated Operational Coordinator of the Operation Acolhida. The Brazilian Armed Forces started to be responsible for the logistic part of the Operation Acolhida although the institution also participated in the Reception, Identification, Sorting, Health Activities and Relocation phases of the operation as shown in the figure above. However, it is the responsibility of the international organizations to select the migrants to the shelters and who is going to be relocated to other regions in Brazil, “in this process, it is up to the UNHCR to identify and profile people interested in participating in the relocation”\(^\text{136}\).

In the Sorting Station in Boa Vista, along with the Federal Police, there are twenty-two militaries personal responsible for the assistance of migrants seeking asylum, to clarify doubts or to migratory status renewal. Also, working in partnership with the Ministry of Labour the Brazilian militaries helped in the emission of two hundred work permission per day. Furthermore, the Brazilian militaries work with the Ministry of Health in vaccination activities for migrants in the Boa Vista Sorting Station.\(^\text{137}\)

After the assistance federalization of Venezuelan migrants, the Federal Government and the UNHCR started to be responsible for the management of the shelters in Roraima. Hereby, the Ministry of Defense was responsible for the entire management of the shelters

\(^{135}\) Second Trimestral Report of Federal Committee of Assistance (Segundo Relatorio Trimestral, Comitê Federal de Assistência Emergencial), Civil House, October 2018: 3-4.


providing support in the food supply, medical and dental care, reforms to improve the local infrastructure, garbage and waste collection, security and maintenance activities\textsuperscript{138}.

As a result of the increasing flow of Venezuelan migrants to Roraima, the region started to face a series of criminal activities in cities hosting migrants. Facing this issue, and reporting of been concerned about the security of the population and migrants, the Brazilian Federal Government established a Federal Decree to guarantee the law and order (GLO) in the region. This decree gives to the Brazilian armed forces temporary law enforcement and security roles at the region\textsuperscript{139} and should prevail from August 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2018 until September 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2018\textsuperscript{140}, however, it prevailed until March 31st, 2019\textsuperscript{141}. One must highlight the law enforcement activities were not part of Operation Acolhida but rather a parallel effort regulated by different decrees and legislations.

3.2 Challenges and limits for the use of national military assistance

Operation Acolhida offers important insights to answer the question of what challenges and limits of the use of national military assistance in time of crisis are. This question can be answered by analyzing the positive aspects, difficulties and limits of the military support in the operation and generalizing its lessons to be applicable in future cases. I will divide it into two subsections to better answer the question.

3.2.1 Immediate response, logistic expertise and medical support

As for the positive aspects, it was possible to highlight that Brazil's Federal Government decision to federalize the humanitarian response\textsuperscript{142} in the Roraima state using the national military to support, made it possible to organize the flow and provide an immediate and

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, p 7.


\textsuperscript{140} Decree n 9.483 from August 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2018. See: http://www.in.gov.br/materia/-/asset_publisher/Kujrw0TZC2Mb/content/id/38774484/do1-2018-08-29-decreto-n-9-483-de-28-de-agosto-de-2018-38774314.


\textsuperscript{142} With the federalization of the humanitarian response in Roraima, the Venezuelans assistance and the shelters in Roraima became managed by the Brazil Federal government and UNHCR. Second Trimestral Report of Federal Committee of Assistance (Segundo Relatorio Trimestral, Comite Federal de Assistência Emergencial), Civil House, October (2018): 7
precise emergency response through the military logistic expertise. As said before, Sebbah et alli offers two frameworks for the analysis of military support: (1) the military support classification and (2) the military relief response cycle\textsuperscript{143}. Operation *Acolhida* shows us the use of national military support for direct, indirect and infrastructure support during the life saving phase of the relief cycle.

These steps refer to the moment from the very beginning to the stabilization of the situation in the Roraima state\textsuperscript{144}. At this time, the military used its expertise in logistics and its capacity to access difficult areas to build local infrastructure to organize the migrant flow in the border with Venezuela. This was only possible, because the Brazilian Army already had a border outpost\textsuperscript{145} in the region and therefore, they only had to move the army personnel and civilian agencies to that location. Also, the Brazilian armed forces were the only ones capable of responding immediately due to its logistic experience and previous contracts for shelters acquired at the Amazon Log training exercise in 2017\textsuperscript{146}. The previous experience of the Brazilian militaries had a significant impact in the Federalization of the humanitarian response in Brazil. Along with this, there is the fact that the local government of Roraima was not capable to deal with the crisis alone and asked for the Federal Government help. This can be seen mostly as a main positive consequence of the use of national military because if it was not for this immediate deployment, social crisis in the Roraima state would have kept unstable.

Lastly the military medical support of the Brazilian Armed Forces in coordination with other areas allowed a control of the disease outbreak in Roraima as part of the direct, indirect and infrastructure support presented by Sebbah et alli\textsuperscript{147}. Before the operation, in late


\textsuperscript{145} The Third Special Border Platoon of the Brazilian Army is located in Pacaraima and is the main site of Acolhida Operation. See: http://www.7bis.eb.mil.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83

\textsuperscript{146} Amazon Log was a Multinational Interagency Exercise of Humanitarian Logistics in the triple border of Brazil, Peru and Colombia in 2017. https://www.defesa.gov.br/noticias/36737-amazonlog-comeca-em-tabatinga-am-maior-exercicio-de-ajuda-humanitaria-do-brasil

2017 and early 2018, several cases of measles were reported in Boa Vista\textsuperscript{148}. The establishment of the Advanced Service Station and a field hospital in the Pacaraima site of the Operation provided control of diseases and created a health barrier in the border\textsuperscript{149}. This medical support can also be considered a positive aspect of the military deployment because without this coordinated action diseases outbreak could be worsened.

3.2.2. Timing, blurring the lines, relocation phase and coordination with regional governments

As for the difficulties, the first one can be the timing of the political decision to deploy the national military. Since the military cannot and must not respond without the political decision, the Federal Government waited until the regional government of Roraima was unable to deal with the migration flow to interfere. Although the design, logistic support and military deployment was very rapid, this took at least four months as the migration crisis and social problems in Roraima worsened.

A second difficulty refers to possible blurring the lines in the assistance on the use of the Brazilian military to guarantee the law and order (GLO) in the region. At the same time that there were Brazilian military forces providing humanitarian assistance along with international organizations, there were also Brazilian military assets carrying out the GLO mandate because the local police force of Roraima was not capable to respond to the criminal activities happening in the region alone. Albeit the GLO mandate was not considered part of the Operation Acolhida and it was not the same military personnel who acted in the military humanitarian assistance operation and the law and order mandate, population and migrants cannot distinguish those from the military personnel providing assistance from those providing security measures. Even though it was not a conflict context, it is an example in a smaller scale of the problem of blurring the lines when using national military assistance to respond to humanitarian crisis.

The third difficulty can be seen as the difficulty on the relocation phase of the Operation and on the recovery phase of the military disaster response cycle in humanitarian relief operations. It is possible to see that, after the first response phase, the operation has been facing difficulties on the logistic side of the migrant relocation as well as to follow up their activities regionally. This is not to the lack of effort from the operation side -- which


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, p 6-7.
have been several -- but rather from coordination difficulties with civilian agencies (on the operational level) and regional governments (on the strategic level).

On the strategic level, due to the low local capacity of the Roraima government to respond to the crisis, a faster relocation was necessary. Nevertheless, Brazil is a Federative Republic\(^\text{150}\), which means that each and every state have autonomy to decide in favor or against the migration relocation. Thereby, the Federal Government, in addition to build partnerships with national and international organizations and national agencies, had also to cooperate and to partner with local governments in the response\(^\text{151}\). This also demanded a constant effort of advocacy\(^\text{152}\) from the Brazilian Federal Government with the municipalities as most of advocacy movements takes time to be implemented. Until June 2019, Brazilian Federal Government had created an Intent Protocol with the National Municipalities Confederation (CNM) with the objective to increase the number of interiorized migrants and the advocacy efforts. However, efforts have been moving slowly with few concrete actions\(^\text{153}\).

Another example is the fact that there were labor groups responsible for the follow up of the Venezuelan migrants in other regions of Brazil, but they have closed and some migrants in some regions face labor exploration and have to go back to live in the streets as presented Paolo Parise, a priest from the Peace Mission, in an interview\(^\text{154}\). The priest stated that:

> It is not enough to relocate. There was a lack of concern about the after they arrived: the process of finding a job, to rent a place to live, to learn Portuguese. Regions that were not used with migrants did not know about their documentation\(^\text{155}\).

\(^{150}\) The Federative Republic of Brazil is composed by 26 states and a Federal District with regional legislative autonomy.

\(^{151}\) “The law n 13.684 from June 21\(^{\text{st}}\), 2018 established in the 4\(^{\text{th}}\) article that the emergency assistance measures to receive people in vulnerable situation resulting from the migratory flow caused by humanitarian crises, have the objective of articulate integrated actions to be performed by the federal, state, district and municipal governments, by adhering to a federative cooperation, which will establish the responsibilities of the federative entities involved”. Law n. 13.684 from June 21\(^{\text{st}}\), 2018. See: https://www2.camara.leg.br/login/fed/lei/2018/lei-13684-21-junho-2018-786881-publicacaooriginal-155890-pl.html

\(^{152}\) According to the Cambridge Dictionary, advocacy means “public support of an idea, plan, or way of doing something”. See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/advocacy

\(^{153}\) Until now, the main action was a campaign called “More Human Relocation” (Interiorização + Humana) and a possible Regional Seminar in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.


This strategic problem also reflects on the operational level. The graph below presents that during 2018 and early 2019 there was a heavy reliance on military flights to transport migrants. However, in early 2019, when the military aircraft leasing from Ministry of Defense was finished, relocation efforts dropped significantly. Thus, with time, the significant increase in the number of migrants and the aircraft leasing problems, the armed force aircrafts started to be insufficient to relocate everyone. Facing this difficulty, the Brazilian Armed Forces had to partner first with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and finally after February 2019, with commercial flights from the civil society. The Ministry of Defense has been trying to create a new deal, but these negotiations are still ongoing\textsuperscript{156}.

![Graph: evolution of migrant relocation from Operation Acolhida between, 2018-2019](source)

Considering these problems on the strategic and operational level of the relocation, it is possible to infer that there was a prioritization of efforts on the emergency relief phase of Operation Acolhida, congruently with the moment of the use of national military. Therefore, there are difficulties to implement concrete effective actions at the development phase and consequently to create a clear exit strategy\textsuperscript{157} on the long-term of the operation. Albeit there

\textsuperscript{156} Currently the Ministry of Defense faces difficulties to provide aircraft to Operation Acolhida. The leasing of a Boeing 767 used in the operation is now over and the Ministry has only smaller aircrafts. See: Casa Civil, “Assistência Emergencial aos Imigrantes Venezuelanos Operação Acolhida - Fase 2 2/2019”. PowerPoint Presentation. July 18, 2019.

\textsuperscript{157} According to C-Safe “Practical Guidance for Developing Exit Strategies in the field”, exit strategy “refers to the withdrawal of all externally provided program resources from an entire program area. See: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A02C7B78FB2B408B852570AB006EC7BA-What%20We%20Know%20About%20Exit%20Strategies%20-%20Sept%202005.pdf.
are limited economic resources and a long learning process of coordination among actors that
should be taken into consideration, coordination among municipalities and civilian agencies
still needs to be further developed so to promote a qualified response to migrants in other
Brazilian states.

4 CONCLUSION

This dissertation was guided by the following research question: what are the challenges and
limits for the response when using national military in times of crisis? The main objective of
this study was to analyze the roles and responsibilities of the national military in different
contexts of crisis response. In my analysis for this topic many actors played a significant role
as local governments, national agencies, national and international organizations and national
military forces. Over this dissertation, I focused on respecting and highlighting the
individuality of each actor, being neutral in my work and showing the different aspects of
which relation being neutral in my analysis.

My goal is to analyze the various contexts where the national military was used and
also to analyze how the affected state made use of this approach. To enable me to be impartial
in my analysis, I discussed the use of the national military by the affected state in different
contexts and in different countries with different government characteristics. Lastly, I
focused my case study in Brazil that is facing a humanitarian crisis as never seen before in the
country and the national military is playing a significant role in the response along with
national agencies, local governments and international humanitarian organizations. My
analysis was based on literature review and the case study of Brazil during the Operation
Acolhida. I used a combination of the LRRD response cycle timeframe, the military
humanitarian response cycle and the classification of military humanitarian support as my
analytical grid.

By analyzing my case I am able to conclude that the use of national military in time
of crisis faces four main challenges:

- **timing of the political decision and the military deployment:** this refers to the
difficulty for political leaders to decide to employ the military and mainly the long-
process of the initial learning process of coordinating the response;
• **blurring the lines between humanitarian assistance and security missions:** there has to be a clear distinction, of the intentions of the use of national military support to avoid blurring the lines of assistance and security measures in the response.

• **relocation and development phase:** to ensure the quality in the response, it is important that all the actors involved in the response to focus in the long-term assistance as much as in the short-term one.

• **coordination with other actors in the strategic and operational levels:** in the case of Brazil, it is very important the coordination between the agencies and the regions where the migrants are relocated to ensure the quality and the responsibility of the response.

   However, I must also highlight the benefits of this involvement. The analysis of my case study provided me with three main benefits: (1) immediate response; (2) logistic expertise; (3) medical support. The Brazilian national military played an important role in the provision of these three aspects. Also, the capacity of the Brazilian Government in the coordination among the national agencies, national military and the organizations responsible for the response, has to be highlighted too. If it is possible to say that Brazil is being able to respond to the humanitarian crisis that is facing at the moment, the coordination among the actors involved in the assistance has guarantee the success of the first phases of the operation.

   As a final note, I would like to make a recommendation for future discussions about the topic. There should be a clear Guideline for the use of the national military assistance in host countries, as there is the Oslo Guidelines for the use of foreign military assistance in emergencies. Such as the Oslo Guidelines, this guide should be responsible to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and pursue common goals. Both the affected state and international organizations would benefit from a guide that facilitates the dialogue and interaction between the actors involved in the assistance. Moreover, the affected community would benefit even more with this type of management since the intentions in the actors involved in the assistance would be clear.
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UN Humanitarian Resolution 46/182, 1991


### Appendix I – Roles and Responsibilities by Federal Subcommittee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECEPTION, IDENTIFICATION AND SORTING&lt;sup&gt;158&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>HEALTH ACTIVITIES&lt;sup&gt;159&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>RELOCATION OF MIGRANTS&lt;sup&gt;160&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Define procedures for border organization at the Roraima state</td>
<td>1. Actions to control epidemics outbreak</td>
<td>1. Define procedures for relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support management of migrants’ registration in the Roraima state</td>
<td>2. Implement actions in the advanced service station and in the military hospital</td>
<td>2. Support the UN in migration registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organize and provide regularization of migrants in the Roraima state</td>
<td>3. Coordinate federal actions for health in the Roraima state</td>
<td>3. Coordinate with local governments availability of reception vacancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Organize health surveillance in the border</td>
<td>4. Coordinate with local governments common strategies for a proper health response</td>
<td>4. Keep updated shelter vacancies data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Organize and promote immunization of migrants in the border</td>
<td>5. Coordinate migrants healthcare in the Roraima state</td>
<td>5. Select migrants to be relocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Organize migrants' shelters and humanitarian reception</td>
<td>6. Promote integration between technicians and managers of the local healthcare system</td>
<td>6. Provide relocation procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Organize and promote customs control</td>
<td>7. Establish directives and clinical procedures for migrants</td>
<td>7. Follow up of relocated migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Plan, implement and monitor strategies to organize and speed up migrant reception</td>
<td>8. Keep update data about migrants’ vaccination</td>
<td>8. Create social inclusion strategies to local governments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brazil (2019).
Elaborated by the author.

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<sup>158</sup> Resolution 2 of *Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance*, March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2018.

<sup>159</sup> Resolution 4 of *Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2018.

<sup>160</sup> Resolution 3 of *Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2018.
# Appendix II – Roles and responsibilities of actors in Operation Acolhida

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>SUBCOMMITTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relocation of Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Security[^161]</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour[^162]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Citizenship[^163]</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning, Development and Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Regional Development[^164]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights[^165]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[^161]: In 2019, the ministry was incorporated by the Ministry of Justice and so did its roles and responsibilities in Operation Acolhida.

[^162]: The ministry was extinguished in 2019.

[^163]: Until 2018, it was named Ministry of Social Development.

[^164]: In 2019, the ministry was incorporated by the Ministry of Economy.

[^165]: Until 2018, it was named Ministry of Human Rights.
## Appendix III – Table: Military activities in support of Humanitarian Relief Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field engineering</td>
<td>Provide general military engineering capabilities, e.g., bridge construction for vehicles and/or pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine construction</td>
<td>Construct latrines to prevent the spread of disease, and ensure a hygienic disposal of human faeces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road/ airfield construction</td>
<td>Prepare and conduct road/airstrip repair/construction to improve existing transportation systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training mine awareness/ purification</td>
<td>Provide mine awareness/clearing training support to population and/or HR personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water treatment/ purification</td>
<td>Operate water purification equipment to provide potable water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field hospital</td>
<td>Provide full range of military medical support in austere environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio and satellite communication</td>
<td>Establish a radio communication system to support information exchange within the area of operations, and satellite communication to support information exchange both within and out of the area of relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed wing strategic airlift</td>
<td>Provide strategic airlift of humanitarian goods/cargo and the transportation of emergency personnel and equipment to the crisis area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical support phase</td>
<td>Provide personnel, vehicles and communications equipment to support a filed mission headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed wing/ helicopter theatre airlift</td>
<td>Provide regional airlift (short-haul) capability for delivery of personnel, equipment, and/or humanitarian cargo within the crisis region in coordination with the UN Air Operations Centre, local authorities and humanitarian organizations involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine clearing</td>
<td>Provide mine clearing services in support of HROs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sebbah et alli (2013: 84).
Appendix IV – Map: Brazil-Venezuela Border

Source: Poder 360, adapted.

Appendix V – Map: Humanitarian Logistic Task Force of Pacaraima (border with Venezuela)

Source: Brazilian Army (2019), adapted.

Appendix VI

Figure: Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance (Operation Acolhida) governance in 2019, Ministries, International Organizations and Social Organizations

Source: Brazilian Civil House (2019).
Appendix VII
Operation Acolhida Timeline

Provisional Measure n° 820
Establish emergency assistance measures for migrants; Recognizes the emergency humanitarian crisis; Creates the Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance

February 15th

Provisional Measure n° 823
Opens extraordinary credit of R$ 100 millions to the Ministry of Defense

February 21th

Law n° 13.684
Establish humanitarian assistance measures for migrants

March 9th

Resolution n° 1
Establish the General Eduardo Planho as Operational Coordinator

March 26th

Resolution n° 2
Establish the Federal Subcommittee for Relocation of Migrants

May 2nd

Resolution n° 3
Establish the Federal Subcommittee for Reception, Identification and Sorting of Migrants

June 21th

Resolution n° 4
Establish the Federal Committee for Health Activities for migrants

October 8th

Provisional Measure n° 837
Opens extraordinary credit of R$ 75.2 millions to the Ministry of Defense

November 20th

Resolution n° 5
Include the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Public Security in the Federal Subcommittee for Relocation of Migrants

December 4th

1 Meeting New Government Federal Committee
Decision to keep and improvement of the Operation Acolhida

October 18th

Resolution n° 6
Include the Federal Subcommittee for Reception of Migrants in vulnerable situations

December 15th

Resolution n° 7
Auditar changes in the composition and coordination of the subcommittees by act of the President of the Federal Committee

January 15th

Law
Include resources for the MRE aiming donations to international institutions

January 15th

Provisional Measure n° 880
Opens extraordinary credit of R$ 223.8 millions to Operation Acolhida

January 15th

Source: Brazilian Civil House (2019).